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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
I. 
Where A Felony Charging Enhancement Is Predicated On A Prior Conviction For 
Violating A Foreign State's Substantially Conforming Statute, The State Has No 
Evidentiary Burden Of Proving, As An Element Of The Offense, That The Foreign 
Statute Substantially Conforms To Idaho's 
Schall contends the state had an evidentiary burden of proving that Wyoming's 
DUI statute - under which he was previously convicted, and on which his felony 
charging enhancement was based - substantially conforms to Idaho's DUI statute. 
(Appellant's brief on review, pp. 7-8.) According to Schall, whether the Wyoming statute 
substantially conforms to Idaho's statute is an element of the crime for which he was 
charged. (Appellant's brief on review, pp. 8-9.) The issue of the Wyoming statute's 
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substantial conformity is not an element of Schall's crime because it is a purely legal 
question subject to free review. 1 The cases cited by Schall fail to support his arguments 
otherwise. 
Schall cites State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 890 n.2, 231 P.3d 532, 535 n.2 (Ct. 
App. 2010), to argue that "charging enhancements" such as I.C. § 18-8005(6), which 
elevate a misdemeanor DUI to a felony, "constitute elements of the enhanced crimes." 
(Appellant's brief on review, p. 9). Schall misreads and misapplies Moore. In Moore, 
"there was insufficient evidence to sustain [Moore's] conviction for the DUI felony 
enhancement" because the copy of the foreign state's "judgment of conviction . . . 
offered as evidence was not certified and therefore was not authenticated." kl at 892, 
231 P.3d at 537. It was the prior conviction on which the charging enhancement was 
based - not the statute under which Moore was previously convicted - that constituted 
an element of the enhanced crime. kl Here, Schall's prior Wyoming DUI conviction 
was an element of his charging enhancement. Evidence of that conviction was 
admitted without objection. (Preliminary Hearing Tr., p. 3, Ls. 2-15.) Thus, the 
undisputed evidence satisfied the state's burden of proving the charging enhancement. 
Schall also cites Cope v. State, 89 Idaho 64, 402 P.2d 970 (1965), and State v. 
Segovia, 93 Idaho 208, 457 P.2d 905 (1969). (Appellant's brief on review, pp. 11-13.) 
1 Despite Schall's suggestion that the state raises this argument for the first time on 
review (Appellant's brief on review, pp. 2, 16), the state has consistently argued that 
substantial conformity is a purely legal issue (see Respondent's brief, p. 4). As such the 
issue cannot be an element of Schall's offense, requiring evidentiary proof (see 
Respondent's brief in support of petition for review, p. 11). Further, it is irrelevant 
whether the state raised the argument in Respondent's brief, because Schall bears the 
burden of establishing error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 
(2010) (an appellant claiming error has the "duty to establish that such an error 
occurred"). 
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These cases were discussed in the state's brief in support of petition for review and will 
not be re-discussed here. (See Respondent's brief in support of petition for review, pp. 
9-10). In addition, Schall cites, as he did on appeal to the Court of Appeals, State v. 
Monaghan, 116 Idaho 972, 783 P.2d 311 (Ct. App. 1989). As with Moore, Cope and 
Segovia, Schall misinterprets and misapplies Monaghan. 
In Monaghan, the defendant was cited for failing to yield to an emergency vehicle 
under I.C. § 49-645 (since replaced by I.C. § 49-625). 116 Idaho at 973, 783 P.2d at 
312. Under I.C. § 49-645, drivers of any vehicle must yield the right-of-way U[u]pon the 
immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle making use of an audible or 
visible signal, meeting the requirements of section 49-606, Idaho Code." ~ The Court 
of Appeals held that U[t]he statutory conditions are elements of the offense," thus the 
state had the burden of proving "that at least one of the emergency warning devices" 
complied with I.C. § 49-606. ~ at 975, 783 P.2d at 314. In other words, the state had 
to establish a fact: whether the emergency vehicle to which Monaghan allegedly failed 
to yield used audible or visible signals satisfying I.C. § 49-606. 
Schall argues, 'There is little difference between the requirement that a police 
siren have a minimum decibel range and the requirement that a foreign conviction 
substantially conform to I.C. § 18-8004(1 )." (Appellant's brief on review, p. 11.) To the 
contrary, the difference is the essence of the state's argument. Whether a siren is at a 
minimum decibel range is an issue of fact. Whether a foreign conviction substantially 
conforms to an Idaho statute is a question of law. In Monaghan, the state had the 
burden of proving facts, not producing a copy of a statute. 
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Under Monaghan, Moore, Cope, and Segovia, the state had the burden of 
proving the fact of Schall's prior conviction as an element of the charging enhancement. 
That fact was established, and the state's burden satisfied, when Schall's conviction 
was admitted without objection at the preliminary hearing. (Preliminary Hearing Tr., p. 
3, Ls. 2-15.) The cases cited by Schall did not require the state to prove that 
Wyoming's DUI statute substantially conforms to Idaho's because substantial conformity 
is a legal question. It is not an element of the charging enhancement requiring 
evidentiary proof. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Schall's motion to 
dismiss for failure to "prove" the legal question. 
II. 
Schall Fails To Articulate A Legal Basis Why The State Must "Prove" Or Produce A 
Copy Of The Foreign Statute Under Which He Was Previously Convicted 
Schall argues that the state must be required to produce a copy of the foreign 
statute under which he was previously convicted. (Appellant's brief on review, p. 15.) 
According to Schall, the absence of such a requirement would "allow a magistrate to 
bind defendants over to the district court for a felony DUI when one of the predicate 
foreign convictions is entirely unrelated to drinking alcohol and driving." (Appellant's 
brief on review, p. 13.) In so arguing, Schall again ignores the premise of the state's 
argument: whether Wyoming's DUI law substantially conforms to Idaho's is a question 
of law that the magistrate determines at the preliminary hearing. The magistrate 
determines, as a matter of law, whether a prior conviction was for Violating a foreign 
statute that substantially conforms to Idaho's. In conducting this legal analysis, the 
magistrate could determine that the foreign statute is entirely unrelated to the Idaho law. 
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If the magistrate errs in its legal determination, the issue would be subject to free review 
on appeal. 
Arguing that a foreign statute is "evidence" that must be considered under 
Idaho's Rules of Evidence, Schall cites White v. White, 94 Idaho 26, 480 P.2d 872 
(1971). Schall misreads and misapplies White. In that marital dissolution case, the trial 
court determined that the appellant was not entitled to child support based on the 
court's factual finding that the Whites' daughter had reached majority age. kL at 28-29, 
480 P.2d at 874-75. Under Idaho law, the daughter reached majority age at 18, but 
under Pennsylvania law, the daughter did not reach majority age until 21. kL On 
appeal, the appellant argued this finding was in error because the trial court should 
have applied the law of Pennsylvania, where the daughter and appellant resided. kL at 
27-29,480 P.2d at 873-75. 
The Supreme Court recognized that the law in Idaho had been "that the 
proponent of the law of a sister state must prove such law, and Idaho courts cannot take 
judicial notice of a sister state's law." kL at 29, 480 P.2d at 875 (citing Newell v. Newell, 
77 Idaho 335,361,293 P.2d 663 (1956)). The rule, borne from "difference of languages 
and inaccessibility of sourcebooks," provided that "laws of foreign nations would not be 
noticed but must be pleaded and proved as facts." kL (citing C. McCormick, Evidence, 
§ 326, at 696 (1954)). Finding the rule "more cumbersome than useful in its broad 
present day application," the Court noted that U[m]odern communications have put the 
statutory compilations of other states within easy access of Idaho's courts." kL at 29-
30,480 P.2d at 875-76. The Court continued 
Where the laws of sister states are ascertainable with verifiable certainty 
those laws should be the [sic] subject to judicial notice by Idaho's courts, 
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for the reasons supportive of judicial notice generally: economy of time 
and effort in the judicial process by doing away with the necessity of 
formal proofs of facts where such proofs are not necessary to the sure 
ascertainment of the particular facts. 
!sL at 30, 480 P.2d at 876. 
In addition, the White Court stated, "A request for judicial notice of the law of a 
sister state serves the function of alerting the trial court to the contention that the law of 
another state is applicable, gives opposing counsel an opportunity to become familiar 
with that law, and enables the proponent to submit the applicable law."!sL In White, 
because the appellant failed to ask the trial court to take judicial notice of 
Pennsylvania's law regarding majority age, she "cannot now complain that the court did 
not exercise this power." !sL The Court concluded, "In the absence of appellant 
submitting the Pennsylvania statute, the trial court was fully justified in applying Idaho 
law." !sL at 31,480 P.2d at 877. Schall's case is distinguishable. 
Here, in contrast to White, there is no question regarding which state's law to 
apply to the facts. Further, Schall does not contend that the trial court was not alerted 
to the applicability of Wyoming's DUI law, or that he lacked the opportunity to become 
familiar with the Wyoming law. Rather, the applicability of Wyoming's DUI law was 
apparent from the complaint, charging Schall with the repeated offense of DUI, 
"defendant having plead [sic] guilty to, or been found guilty of, two prior offenses ... 
[including] in the Third Judicial District of the State of Wyoming." (R., p. 10.) A 
requirement that the state must request judicial notice of the statute would serve no 
purpose, as an accurate copy of the statute "is within easy access of Idaho's courts" 
and the parties here. White, 94 Idaho at 30, 480 P.2d at 876. Such requirement would 
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in fact be contrary to the reasons supportive of judicial notice - judicial economy and 
doing away with burdens of proving facts where such proof is unnecessary. See 1.9.:. 
Schall also cites a West Virginia case, State v. Hulbert, 209 W.va. 217, 544 
S.E.2d 919 (W.Va. 2001), to argue that the state must produce a copy of a foreign 
statute at a preliminary hearing. (Appellant's brief on review, p. 20.) In that case, the 
Court considered whether the trial court erred in finding that two prior out-of-state 
convictions for domestic violence supported a charging enhancement. 1.9.:. The court 
held that the state must "introduce the relevant statutes of the foreign states to enable 
the trial court to take judicial notice of those statutes," but includes no legal reasoning, 
nor even a citation to prior case law, to support the requirement. 1.9.:. at 226, 544 S.E.2d 
at 928. Further, "neither the 'Certificates of Conviction' [nor] any other evidence in the 
case identifies the [out-of-state] statutes under which Appellant was purportedly 
charged and convicted." 1.9.:. at 225, 544 S.E.2d at 927. The record was "utterly silent as 
to the first conviction and ... the factual predicates for the second conviction is of 
problematic value." 1.9.:. at 225-26, 544 S.E.2d at 927-28. Thus, in Hulbert - unlike here 
- the fact of defendant's prior convictions, and the determination of which foreign 
statutes applied, were subject to dispute. 1.9.:. For these reasons, Schall has not 
demonstrated why this Court should consider Hulbert. 
Schall has failed to establish that the state was required to produce a copy of the 
Wyoming DUI statute, or request the magistrate to take judicial notice of it at his 
preliminary hearing. At the preliminary hearing, evidence of Schall's Wyoming 
conviction was admitted without objection, thus satisfying the state's burden of proving 
the fact of Schall's prior conviction and establishing probable cause. (Preliminary 
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Hearing Tr., p. 3, Ls. 2-15.) Whether Wyoming's DUI statute substantially conforms to 
Idaho's is a question of law for which there was no burden of proof. (See Respondent's 
brief in support of petition for review, pp. 8-11.) A copy of the Wyoming statute was 
easily accessible by the parties and court. 2 To require the state to present a copy or 
request judicial notice of the Wyoming DUI statute would serve no practical function. 
Such a formalistic requirement would be contrary to the reasoning in White, and should 
therefore be rejected. 
III. 
Wyoming's DUI Statute Substantially Conforms To Idaho's 
Schall's final argument is that he should not have been bound over to district 
court because Wyoming's DUI statute does not substantially conform to Idaho's. 
(Appellant's brief on review, pp. 22-29.) Schall concedes that, "under the Court of 
Appeals' current case law, the facts of his Wyoming conviction are not relevant to the 
statutory comparison." (Appellant's brief on review, p. 25 n.S.) However, Schall states, 
the Court "is not bound by the Court of Appeal [sic] holding." (Id.) Schall fails to show 
that the reasoning in the applicable Court of Appeals' decisions is unsound, or that 
those decisions should otherwise be overturned. 
As already addressed in the Respondent's brief on appeal, Wyoming's DUI 
statute substantially conforms to Idaho's under the analysis used by the Court of 
Appeals in State v. Schmoll, 144 Idaho SOO, 172 P.3d 555 (Ct. App. 2007). There, the 
Court addressed whether Montana's DUI law substantially conforms to Idaho's, noting 
that "the focus of the comparison should be on the elements of the statutes, and not the 
2 Schall produced a copy of Wyoming's DUI statute - pulled from the State of 
Wyoming's website - to the district court with his motion to dismiss. (12/20/11 Tr., p. 9, 
Ls. 3-5; R., pp. 52-57.) 
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specific conduct giving rise to the prior violation." kL at 803, 172 P.3d at 558 (citing 
former I.C. § 18-8005(8), now I.C. § 18-8005(10)). 
Recognizing that Idaho and Montana use BAC test results differently, the 
Schmoll court nonetheless determined that both states "prohibit the same essential 
conduct - driving while under the influence of alcohol." kl The Schmoll Court 
concluded that Montana's and Idaho's DUI statutes "frame their prohibitions using the 
same language, requiring substantially conforming elements to be met to sustain a 
violation." kL Montana's and Wyoming's use of BAC results in their DUI laws are 
indistinguishable for purposes of this Court's analysis. (See Respondent's brief, pp. 5-
8.) Under Schmoll, this Court must conclude that Wyoming's DUI law substantially 
conforms to Idaho's. 
The Court of Appeals applied the same analysis in the more recent decision, 
State v. Juarez, 155 Idaho 449,313 P.3d 777 (Ct. App. 2013). In Juarez, the Court held 
that Nevada's DUI statute substantially conforms to Idaho's. kl Citing Schmoll and 
Moore, the Court in Juarez reiterated that 
interpreting the substantially conforming requirement to mean that 
"another state's DUI statute may never encompass conduct that would not 
be illegal in Idaho ... would deviate from the general thrust of Schmoll 
and I.C. § 18-8005([10]), as well as run counter to the legislature's clear 
intent evidenced by using the term 'substantially conforming,' as opposed 
to a dictate that the statutes be exactly the same." 
kL at _, 313 P.3d at 781 (citing Moore, 148 Idaho at 898, 231 P.3d at 543). This 
reasoning applies with equal force in Schall's case. 
Schall highlights breath test results from his Wyoming incident, showing .068 and 
.066. (Appellant's brief on review, p. 25 n.8, citing Prelim. Tr., p. 21, Ls. 8-12, and 
Harris Aff. (attached to Appellant's Am. Mot. to Augment), p. 2.) Schall then urges the 
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court to consider that he would not have been prosecuted under Idaho's per se 
provision - precluding prosecution where BAC results are below 0.08 - had the 
Wyoming incident occurred in Idaho. (Appellant's brief on review, p. 25 n.8.) Schall 
essentially asks the Court to adopt California's standard of law, rejected in Schmoll, that 
another state's conviction is recognized only if the conduct that violated the other state's 
statute also violates California's statute. Schmoll, 144 Idaho at 804-05, 172 P.3d at 
559-60 (citing People v. Crane, 142 Cal.App.4th 425, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 334, 336-37 
(2006)). Schall fails to show why this Court should reject the Court of Appeals' 
reasoning in Schmoll and Juarez. At the same time, Schall's argument illustrates why 
this Court should adopt the reasoning in Schmoll and Juarez. 
Schall cites the facts of his Wyoming conviction to argue that Idaho's per se 
provision would have precluded his prosecution in Idaho. (Appellant's brief on review, 
pp. 25-26.) But Schall then concludes that "Wyoming's statute does not substantially 
conform to Idaho's." (Appellant's brief on review, p. 27.) Under Schall's reasoning, 
because Wyoming's law does not prevent prosecution if a BAC test is under .08, no 
prior Wyoming conviction would apply toward a felony enhancement. This would be 
true even if breath test results from a prior Wyoming conviction were well above .08. 
The Court of Appeals' reasoning in Schmoll, Juarez, and Moore is apt. Applying those 
cases, Wyoming's DUI law substantially conforms to Idaho's. 
Finally, even if the Court were to consider the facts from Schall's Wyoming 
incident, those facts (as a whole, rather than just those favorable to Schall) would not 
preclude prosecution under Idaho law. See I.C. § 18-8004(2). Schall's Wyoming 
conviction, on which his enhancement is based, was on a guilty plea to "Driving With a 
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BAC of .08% or higher; or Driving While Under the Influence." (R., p. 65.) As the 
district judge pointed out, the affidavit of Wyoming officer Harris indicates that Schall 
had breath test results of .096 and .100, before the .068 and .066 results. (Harris Aff., 
p. 2.) These facts support the applicability of a prior conviction toward a felony 
enhancement here. Accordingly, Schall fails to show that Wyoming's DUI law does not 
substantially conform to Idaho's. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing arguments, the state respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the district court's appellate decision below. 
DATED this 26th day of February, 2014. 
DAPHNEJ.HUANG 
Deputy Attorney Generar-~-
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